

REMARKS  
BY  
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BEFORE THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RETIREES ASSOCIATION  
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Good afternoon. In the last eight months, I have spoken to many groups -- from training seminars to congressional hearings -- but I especially welcome the opportunity to speak to CIRA. This group more than any other understands the special privileges and special satisfaction of our work. And you, of all others, understand what we need to produce good intelligence -- a clear mission, talented people, sufficient resources, and the ability to protect our sources and methods. I would like to talk to you today about those things that have most recently affected both the mission and the people of the CIA, for some recent events have affected not only how we do our work, but how our work is viewed by the American people. And I would like to talk to you about where we are headed, and why, in spite of occasionally less than favorable publicity, more people than ever before are interested in working at the Central Intelligence Agency.

I suppose that it will come as no surprise that the Iran-Contra investigations had an enormous impact on the Agency and on me. This time last year the Agency was at the center of a storm which threatened to destroy confidence in our role in American life and to shatter the trust that is so indispensable to our mission. Throughout 1987, we were subjected to the most searching inquiry into our part in what has come to be known as the Iran-Contra affair.

It is in that context that I came to this Agency deeply conscious that how we responded to the facts revealed in the inquiries could significantly affect our ability to recapture the trust we deserved, resist intolerable new legislative restrictions, and retain the resources needed to carry out our assignments. At the same time, I knew that whatever administrative

actions were taken must be just and must be based upon our own existing rules -- not imposed from the outside and not carried out precipitously to appease an angry Congress or a critical press.

At the Agency's Senior Intelligence Service promotion ceremony last month, I discussed the actions I took. Because in a real sense I am dealing with family here today, I would like to discuss those actions with you as well, asking only that you treat what is personal here as in the family.

Last July, I announced that I would appoint a Special Counsel to go over the lengthy reports, inquiries, depositions, and other records as they became available and then ask that Special Counsel to make a full written report to me. I said then that I did not wish to initiate yet another investigation, but to gather the available evidence upon which to make findings and upon which to take appropriate action. The Special Counsel commenced his work in September, starting with the review of the report of our own Inspector General. He was given access to the statements and testimony of our employees who were the subject of inquiries by the Inspector General and the Congress.

The Iran-Contra Joint Committee released their report on November 18th, and their findings were likewise analyzed by my Special Counsel.

He offered to meet and discuss the Iran-Contra findings with those facing more serious allegations. The Special Counsel then filed a preliminary report with me. I studied it carefully and I asked a number of questions and received some additional information. This resulted in a final report which has been shared with the oversight committees and with the deputy directors and heads of all independent offices within the Agency. After careful and earnest deliberation, I took administrative action.

It was apparent to me that as an institution we had performed well -- that there was no systemic disrespect for authority, rules, and guidance. But it was also apparent that there had been some violations of Agency rules. I ordered disciplinary action in seven cases. In each case, discipline was based upon serious violation of existing regulations and instructions or failing to give candid responses to our Inspector General and to committees of Congress charged by law with oversight of our work.

No one was disciplined for carrying out instructions of a superior officer. I focused upon violations of clearly given instructions.

Taking disciplinary action is painful and unpleasant. After a quarter of a century of experience with military, criminal, and administrative discipline, it is still painful to me. I know the hurt not only to those involved, but to loyal friends and associates. But it is necessary in order to protect our professional integrity -- no matter what other agencies might do or fail to do under similar circumstances.

The integrity of government organizations that operate in secret can only be maintained by insisting upon disciplined professional compliance with laws and rules imposed to ensure our citizens that we are indeed accountable, and by truthful responses to those charged with reviewing our performance.

I do not need to tell this group that truthfulness within our organization and with those who oversee our work is not a new concept -- it is one deeply rooted in the highest tradition of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I have pledged to uphold that tradition and work for the clearest guidelines that will protect our employees in the future. While I will demand respect for those guidelines, I will insist that they be workable and well

understood, and I will protect all who operate aggressively within their framework.

I have referred to 1987 as a time of testing for the CIA. As you well know, this Agency has been tested before. It is my sense that we have started 1988 with public confidence on the upturn and that we can now put our energies where they belong -- in accomplishing our mission.

While our mission has not changed, the number of people who scrutinize what we do and how we do it has grown substantially. Many of you remember when no classified papers went from the Agency to either branch of Congress and the only classified briefings to congressional committees were given by the Director himself or with the Director present. At one time, the Senate Appropriations Committee had one cleared staffer, the House Appropriations Committee one or two. Today, four congressional committees closely examine the Agency's activities, and the number of individuals who see classified material far exceeds the one or two of the past.

We cannot ignore or wish undone the oversight responsibilities exercised by Congress. And I firmly believe that these responsibilities are both necessary and ultimately beneficial. There must be a dependable system of oversight and accountability which builds, rather than erodes, trust between those who have the intelligence responsibility and those who are the elected representatives of the American people. This means responsible conduct on both sides of the equation.

As part of my effort to establish a good working relationship with the Congress, I meet with the leadership of our oversight committees at least monthly. I may not answer all of their questions if it is not appropriate for

me to do so, but I will not lead Congress to believe I do not know the answers if I do. I simply argue the point that it is not appropriate for me to give the answers and then we negotiate from there.

I've asked for more guidance for all those in the Agency who must deal with the Congress. The Office of Congressional Affairs has prepared and distributed a document outlining what is expected of those who brief or testify before the Congress. In meeting our obligations to fully inform the Congress, we must continue to protect our sources and our methods, but we must not mislead or misinform.

But that does not mean that there is no need for secrecy. It seems quite clear to me that it would be impossible to conduct clandestine activities -- either to collect information or to carry out covert activity -- without secrecy.

If we cannot protect our sources, we will not get the information that we need. If we cannot protect the sensitive methods by which we collect the information, both in terms of individuals on the ground and satellites in space, we will cease to have the means of collecting information.

We must also be able to respond to situations that threaten our national security, using everything that is legally available to us. This includes the use of covert action. Since June, I have visited 12 countries -- including many in the Middle East -- and have observed firsthand the success of our operations overseas. I have met with a great many officers abroad and can tell you with confidence that they are continuing the vital work to which you have contributed so much.

I have also spoken publicly to a number of groups at home. They are, without exception, interested in covert action. Many react to covert action, in particular, and intelligence, in general, in ways that are no doubt familiar to you.

As Vernon Walters mentioned to you at the last luncheon, "Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."

But covert action has been and will continue to be an important part of this Agency's mission. I will see to it that covert action remains the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency where it belongs. And I will see that those who carry out our sensitive assignments overseas have the guidance and protection that they need to do their work aggressively and responsibly.

So far I have provided you with an "in-the-family" view of the effect that the Iran-Contra investigation has had on our Agency. And I have summarized some of our other bread-and-butter issues -- the changing requirements of congressional oversight, the continuing importance of protecting sources and methods, and the continuing need for lawful use of covert action.

Now I would like to spend a moment looking at the future. Many of you may have done some crystal ball gazing yourselves before you left the Agency, and I would like to confirm for you what you may have already suspected. There has been a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of subjects the Intelligence Community is required to address, the number of consumers who use our product, and the resources we need to provide what is asked of us.

While much of our effort is still focused on the Soviet Union, we are spending more time and resources collecting information on Third World nations. We are interested in both the political and economic stability of countries from Brazil to Bangladesh, from Mexico to Malaysia, and from Turkey to Tanzania. We are also concentrating on interdisciplinary problems such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, arms control, and technology transfer.

While I cannot tell you, in this forum, the number of people who receive our publications, I can tell you that the number reflects a substantial increase in the demand for our intelligence.

And the increased demand for intelligence mirrors our increased need for resources. While we have developed sophisticated technical collection systems that provide more and better data, we must recognize that more data is a mixed blessing. And we have needed more people to sift through this data, to analyze it and tell us what it means.

We must also recognize that our ability to fund programs is shrinking while what we demand of intelligence has grown. You all know that budget reductions are being made in order to reduce the deficit. You also know how difficult the decisions are when it comes to determining which programs must be cut or even dropped. After a period of sustained growth in the intelligence budget, we must now do more with less against a worldwide intelligence challenge that has not changed to suit our tightened budget.

This problem is ameliorated somewhat because we have exceptional people to help us. Some of these people you will remember.



Dick Stolz has returned from retirement to head up the Directorate of Operations. [redacted] His return to the Agency was acclaimed by all of the living former DCI's, not an insignificant achievement. And I might add, he has been a friend of mine for over 40 years.

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Bill Donnelly is our new Inspector General. My appointment of Bill underscores the importance I place upon the Office of the Inspector General and its function. Bill has a range of experience that qualifies him to lead this office -- an office which must bridge the parochialism of directorates and focus upon the needs of the entire Agency. [redacted]

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[redacted] he also brings to this position considerable management and administrative experience -- experience which led two years ago to his designation as Deputy Director for Administration.

The new Deputy Director for Administration is Rae Huffstutler, [redacted]

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[redacted] Most recently, Rae was the Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. [redacted]

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I have appointed John Helgerson as the new Director of Congressional Affairs. John moved to this assignment from his position as Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence. He has been deeply involved in the arms control testimony since that time.

His predecessor, Dave Gries, who many of you may remember, is now the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

These talented officers are among those who hold key positions in the Agency. I might add that I brought two from the outside and I am proud that they are very much a part of the Agency today. Bill Baker, a graduate of the University of Virginia, was head of the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs at the FBI. He is now working for the CIA as Director of Public Affairs. And Russell Bruemmer, who served as my law clerk and as a special assistant to me at the FBI, and who also worked at the distinguished law firm of Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering, has joined us as the new General Counsel. He replaces Dave Doherty, who went on to become Senior Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange.

Not only do we have talented leaders, we continue to attract top people who want to join us. Last year, over 100,000 men and women expressed an interest in working for the Central Intelligence Agency. You have no doubt read about the protests on some college campuses where the CIA recruits. Interestingly enough, these protests and the publicity they generate often work in our favor. Our recruitment centers are inundated with resumes after campus demonstrations. But, on an average, we contact only one of every seven people who express an interest in working here.

We are selective, and with good reason. We offer an opportunity to participate in an organization unique in the challenges it faces -- an organization that instills a sense of purpose and provides a sense of accomplishment.

I hope that we will continue to attract those best suited to carry out our mission -- those who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are dedicated and responsive to law and discipline. People who understand and

play by the rules. People who are not preoccupied by fame or fortune, but who see in our work a way to express their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world. Help us find them, for this is what it is all about. This is why you served, why we serve today, and why, God willing, enormously talented and dedicated Americans will be joining us for the great challenges, not yet entirely defined, that will be waiting for us tomorrow.